Remembering Galwan and the China Challenge: Capabilities of the PLA Western Theatre Command

Three years on, the spectre of Galwan is looming large over India’s China policy. Amidst China’s unwillingness to back down and Indian forces’ intensifying willingness to hold their ground, we are likely to see more skirmishes similar to the one witnessed in Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang sector in December last year, taking place. And in this light, an assessment of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capacity-building close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the past three years indicates that China is not planning to concede its strategic entrenchment beyond India’s claim lines. Rather, it is attempting to create a new status quo with increased firepower available for ready use in anticipation of such potential skirmishes. 

Capabilities of the actor India is confronting

In order to build a world-class fighting force by 2050, Chinese President Xi Jinping initiated reforms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 2015, and a cornerstone of said reforms has been the switch from Military Regions (MRs) to Theatre Commands (TCs). Of the five theatre commands created, the Western TC is the one assigned to take care of mountainous/high-altitude offensive and defensive campaigns, and other mobilisation endeavours on the India-China border front. 

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The focus of each theatre command is to become adept at conducting Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations (MDIJO). This indicates that the ground, air, naval, and rocket forces assigned to the command have to seamlessly combine their individual strengths across all frontiers of warfare (including electronic, cyberspace and outer space), to realise the goal of victory on the battlefield. And even though no naval brigades have been assigned to the Western TC (given its land-oriented posture), between 2019 and 2022, there has been a steady increase in its deployment of infantry divisions and brigades, border defense brigades, and missile units on China’s borders with India, Nepal and Bhutan.

In addition, the Western TC is equipped with resources from two sub-theatre-level Military Commands (MCs), namely Xinjiang and Xizang (Tibet). The two MCs were elevated to a sub-theatre level rank in 2016, and came under the direct control of the Western TC’s Ground Forces. This is as opposed to the other provincial-level MCs, which are under the mandate of the National Defence Mobilisation Department of the Chinese Central Military Commission. This signifies that the mission, function, and capabilities of the Xinjiang and Tibet MCs have been expanded, especially since each of them respectively borders one major area of dispute between India and China – Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.

Specialised divisions and equipment are assigned to these MDs to enhance their operational capability in the difficult terrain around the LAC. For example, as per the 2022 ‘Military Balance’, since late 2020, the Xinjiang MC is being equipped with NORINCO Type-08 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, Type-15 light tanks, and Type-99 main battle tanks, which have emerged specifically in Southern Ladakh. As a show of force and tactic near the border, the Tibet MC has engaged in testing of air-defense missile launcher vehicles at altitudes of over 4000 meters in sub-zero temperatures.

To enable transport of important equipment to the frontlines, like cold-resistant gear (such as thermos flasks, cotton-padded coats and anti-fragment goggles), and subsequently even light tanks and helicopters, China has developed a heavy-transport aircraft called the Y-20, and assigned it to the Western TC. In November 2021, the Y-20 demonstrated its capability to fly winter gear to border troops stationed along the LAC within seven hours. It is likely that as the aircraft engages in more such transactions, its time-of-flight and load-carrying capacity will both expand. 

A new capacity the Western TC has been building in the past three years is the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) like quadcopter drones for functions such as delivering food and water to deployed PLA personnel in plateau regions, performing intelligence and surveillance, acquiring targets, and engaging in swarm tactics to disengage enemy lines. Analysts even suggest that China may be ahead of American capabilities to deploy swarm drones. Now, India is preparing to counter this new threat, by planning to induct ‘Zorawar’ light tanks with counter-drone capabilities meant for high-altitude deployment. In 2022, India has also launched the second edition of the Meher Baba Swarm Drones Competition with an aim to find counter-drone solutions for deployment at the border. 

Even though it is unlikely that an eventuality of a nuclear nature emerges on the India-China border, available information on nuclear forces between the two sides indicates that since 2020, while China operates a little over 100 missiles capable of targetting all or elements of Indian mainland, the Indian side maintains only 10 (Agni-III) launchers capable of hitting all of Chinese mainland, and 8 (Agni-II) launchers capable of only reaching Tibet. 

These conventional capabilities exclude other technological strides China has made to actualise a joint operational doctrine at the border. For example, it is investing heavily in space-based and Artificial Intelligence (AI) surveillance capabilities to make Command, Control and Communications (C3) more effective, while also deploying electronic interference units to create an ‘electromagnetic fog’ that can deceive enemy systems or misguide enemy drones. 

Has India drawn its lessons?

The Galwan Valley conflict was a landmark demonstration of the fighting power of Indian forces at the LAC. India’s resolve has been visible in its deployment of 50,000 additional troops along the LAC at the height of tensions in 2020-21, and its plan to deploy two additional mountain strike corps (the 1st and 17th). However, in many areas, it also demonstrated the shortcomings of Indian comprehensive power vis-a-vis China. For example,  the 1st strike corps was initially meant to be deployed to India’s western border with Pakistan, and are now being ‘realigned’ to the LAC. It shows a real financial constraint facing the Indian armed forces, and a lack of balance between the two actively hostile fronts. 

Similarly, border infrastructure and connectivity are a major hurdle for India, because on the one hand, while Chinese troops have motorable roads even beyond Indian claim lines, India’s troops fall short and reach only up to some distance of their claim lines. For ease of transport and air-lift, China has now even inducted the Y-20, for which India does not possess a counterpart.

Overall, there is a mismatch in force capacity between the two sides. The Indian Army’s current LAC deployment across the Northern, Eastern and Central commands is about 225,000, while the Chinese Western TC and its two MCs account for 230,000 troops. 

In the past three years, India has repeatedly emphasised that its primary national security priority is the border with China. But a comparative analysis of the capacities on either side indicates that India has a lot to catch up on, to be able to match Chinese comprehensive power along the LAC. In such a scenario, the focus on research and development in drones, upcoming induction of indigenous Zorawar tanks, expanding endeavours to develop border infrastructure by the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), and multiplying troop deployment, are positive milestones on the long road from Galwan.

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

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