Making a strong and valid case for Japan-India-France grouping

The world has long-ditched the Cold War era, two-camp approach of foreign policy and is steadily adapting to the realities of an increasingly multi-polar world. The result of this shift is more and more interest-specific groupings. These cooperation and partnerships are often based on narrow and specific interests, unlike across-the-board alliances or treaty-bound partnerships. The reason for traction to this approach is that it allows grounds for engagement and possible cooperation despite existing tensions and conflicts. Recall all those burgeoning acronyms that now populate the diplomatic landscape – AUKUS, BRICS, I2U2, Quad, SCO among plenty of others. This piece attempts to make a case for one more, Japan – India – France, call it JIF (or anything that sounds more pleasant – FIJ? IJF?).

The reason for making a case for a more formalised partnership between two of the major and influential G7 members with a growing economy from Global South, is the inherent bilateral strengths and potential for cooperation between Paris, Tokyo, and New Delhi. In recent decades, there has been a traditional consensus among Tokyo and Paris on most major international issues, the importance of their bilateral diplomatic relationship is mostly under-appreciated and is often surrounded by negative headlines such as troubles around the Renault-Nissan partnership. The underappreciation is also visible in increasingly stronger partnerships between Paris and New Delhi, as well as in the ties between New Delhi and Tokyo. Alignment of mutual interests can be the sustaining force for this trilateral grouping.

For New Delhi, the importance of both partnerships is crystal clear. Indo-Japan partnerships have thrived for years and received significant impetus from personal chemistry between leaders in Abe-Modi era. The Japanese capital and technology are treated as crucial in realising India’s developmental aspirations. For example, the choice of Japan’s Shinkansen high-speed rail technology for India’s first bullet train project aptly captures the significance of the growing role of Japan – both in terms of providing technology as well as capital – in India’s strategic decision-making.

Japan still remains a major source for FDI inflows in India, with annual FDI inflow more than USD 1.3 Bn for almost a decade now, peaking in 2017 at around USD 4.2 Bn. The partnership has only gained momentum with similar vision and concerns in Indo-Pacific and working together in Quad grouping alongside the United States and Australia. For Paris, partnership with India has steadily gained momentum and today it serves as its major diplomatic partner outside of the francosphere. New Delhi is also seen as a crucial partner for Paris’s strategic and defence interests, and an important ally for France’ much desired ‘strategic autonomy’, outside of the European Union, G7, and NATO.

For India, Paris is currently her strongest and most reliable support base in the United Nations Security Council, replacing New Delhi’s traditional reliance on Moscow. While New Delhi’s strategic importance has grown both in London and Washington, the strong presence of anti-India interests in the domestic politics of the US and UK often hinders their reliability from New Delhi’s perspective. For India, Paris is also a crucial partner for defence procurement and technology transfer, given the broader and long-term benefits of diversifying away from Moscow as well as maintaining a strategic distance from Washington as key defence suppliers.

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For Tokyo, stronger and more effective partnerships with major European powers as well as large emerging economy allows for a more independent approach to global affairs. For almost stagnant large economies such as Japan, India fares well as a large and growing market for trade and investment activities. Further, while Quad will continue to remain Tokyo’s Indo-pacific pivot, Paris is undoubtedly a major stakeholder in the region and will add value for both Tokyo and New Delhi, as both countries embark on an ambitious security strategy overhaul. The relative absence of Paris in the current Indo-Pacific discourse is indeed awkward, given France’s vast presence in the region through its overseas territories. It is worthwhile to note that more than 90% of France’s exclusive economic zone lies in the Indo-Pacific and not in the Atlantic.

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A trilateral partnership with the potential for cooperation across various areas including emerging technologies, trade, security, and defence cooperation would be mutually beneficial for all three major and influential powers in asserting their individual strategic autonomy. For France and Japan, this arrangement will allow for more independent expression of their defence and security concerns outside of their respective European and American security and diplomatic umbrella. And for India, this will allow her to be a more influential voice of the Global South and reinforce a commitment to a multipolar world and no-camp or own-camp diplomacy.

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.)

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