Myanmar: Why the lady still matters

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), also known as ‘the Lady’, has been a transformative leader in Myanmar’s political evolution since 1988. Daughter of General Aung San – ‘the Father of Burma’; the courageous champion of democracy and human rights whose shine dimmed due to her controversial stand on the Rohingya issue; the state counsellor or effectively the head of government who lost power because of the military coup in February 2021, Suu Kyi is back at the centre of discussions about the nation’s future. After the coup, even many of her supporters wrote off the 77-year-old leader (now 78). The young generation of democracy activists led by the National Unity Government (NUG) believed that the country had moved on, and that she was now history. Yet, a mere partial pardon of her 33-year sentence was enough to bring her into the international limelight again. 

So, what really is the importance of being Aung San Suu Kyi? Can she still make a difference and mould the future trajectory of a crisis-ridden Myanmar? 

Recent developments 

Between 9 July and 1 August 2023, four significant developments took place, which throw light on possible answers to the above questions. 

First, on July 9, Don Pramudwinai, deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Thailand, was allowed by the military government to meet ASSK in prison. What transpired at this one-and-a-half-hour-long meeting is known only to the two participants and the military authorities. However, what the Thai dignitary reported about it at the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Jakarta is known. He conveyed that she was in good health, and favoured dialogue to resolve political issues. ASEAN foreign ministers seemed divided as some criticized him while others considered the meeting a positive development. 

Second, soon thereafter media reports appeared indicating that ASSK has been shifted from the prison to a government bungalow and placed under house arrest. But the military spokesman did not confirm these reports. 

Third, on 31 July the government announced the fourth 6-month extension of ‘emergency’ since the coup. This was violative of the 2008 constitution. The announcement was an admission of their failure to restore normalcy and hold elections in the country. Myanmar has been struck by civil strife and an unending cycle of violent clashes between the government forces and the armed resistance. With the two sides locked in an impasse and with no diplomatic breakthrough secured either by the UN or ASEAN, the nation faces a complicated present and an uncertain future. 

Fourth, on 1 August, the government announced an amnesty for 7,749 prisoners. Among them figured ASSK and U Win Myint, the ousted president. In the former’s case, the 33-year sentence (covering 19 offences) was reduced by 6 years. In the latter’s case, the 12-year sentence (covering 8 offences) was reduced by 4 years. Both leaders would continue serving their sentences, but it was hinted that further pardon was possible. Critics dismissed it as a travesty of justice, arguing that these prominent figures should not have been arrested or sentenced in the first place. 

Larger canvas 

These developments should be viewed on the broader political canvas of unbroken military rule in the country since 1962, except for the decade of March 2011–January 2021 when ‘hybrid’ (or limited) democracy prevailed. Yet another landslide victory in the November 2020 elections for Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy NLD) created a deep sense of insecurity for the military. It then felt compelled to snatch power from elected representatives. From then onwards, ASSK’s removal from office, curbs on NLD, and resort to violence against the people compelled the opposition to adopt a new strategy to fight for full democracy and a true federal union. This also implied the goal to drive the military out of power and send it ‘back to the barracks’. However, in Myanmar’s specific conditions and given persisting ethnic divisions, these goals seem unachievable in the foreseeable future. 

The opposition pinned its hopes on external partners. The Western nations readily imposed economic sanctions, as they had done in the past, but generally, these hurt the people more than the regime. The UN deliberated on Myanmar question several times, urging that democratic institutions and processes be upheld through constructive dialogue and reconciliation as per the will and interests of the people of Myanmar. The Security Council even adopted a unanimous resolution in December 2022. Further, the UN encouraged ASEAN to serve as the main regional player to devise a solution based on its Five-Point Consensus (5PC). ASEAN tried hard but due to the military’s non-cooperation and the grouping’s internal divisions, it has achieved little success in moving Myanmar towards a democratic path.

Implications for stakeholders

Against this backdrop, the implications of the recent developments become clearer.

When it carried out the coup 30 months back, the military had hoped that, as in the past, it would successfully impose its rule. This did not happen. It then announced its plan to hold elections in August 2023, presumably as a means to acquire legitimacy. But, as foreseen by many, violet clashes and nationwide insecurity made it impossible for the government to hold polls. Therefore, it has now taken initial steps to demonstrate that the NLDs can be brought back into political play – for a price. If the old leaders are willing to be pragmatic, they can gradually regain their freedom, provided they agree to an internal political dialogue aimed at re-installing a collaborative model of democracy. 

Besides, the modest pardon to ASSK is a means to divide the opposition, Western governments and ASEAN. It also reflects the military’s implicit recognition that Suu Kyi continues to enjoy an extraordinary sway over her people. The opposition which had written her off, may now be forced to redo its calculations. 

ASEAN, in particular, faces a new dilemma. With its unity on Myanmar broken into pieces, it should recalibrate its approach before its summit in September. It cannot suddenly abandon its 5PC. Nor can it prevent its individual members – not only Thailand and Vietnam but now even Malaysia and the Philippines – from talking to the military government. Perhaps it can urge all Myanmar stakeholders to find a pathway to internal dialogue while offering its help to facilitate it. 

Most importantly, how is ASSK likely to react to the current political impasse? She is a patriot and a politician, acutely conscious of how history will judge her. Therefore, it is realistic to assume that, if and when she regains freedom, she could still be of immense service to her nation. Besides, she carries the moral burden for the coup: many believe that had she shown a flair for ‘give and take’ in January 2021, she might have avoided provoking the generals to stage the coup. 

Based on my deep study and several interactions with Daw Suu Kyi Kyi, I wrote last August that “the Army can keep her shackled for as long as it wants, but whenever it is ready to craft a political solution to the governance issue, the Generals will need to return to her, consult with her and carve out a place for her.” A year later, I stand by this assessment. 

(Disclaimer: The views of the writer do not represent the views of WION or ZMCL. Nor does WION or ZMCL endorse the views of the writer.) 

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